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Walter Kaufmann, Discovering the Mind: Goethe, Kant, and Hegel. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1980. 288 pp. $14. 95. 
Review by Edward Bordeau 
Discovering the Mind is the first volume of a trilogy. Since 
Walter Kaufmann died in September of last year, the publication of 
the remaining two volumes is in question. Although some allusions 
are made to men and ideas to be treated in the subsequent volumes, 
this highly engaging inquiry into the different directions Goethe, 
Kant, and Hegel each travelled on the road to "discovering the mind" 
is executed with such clarity, singleness of purpose, and erudition as 
to be self-contained. In addition to Goethe, Kant, and Hegel, the 
projected trilogy was to include Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber 
(Volume II), and Freud, Adler, and Jung (Volume III). 
Kaufmann does nothing to hide his feelings for the three 
German thinkers he is assessing; on the contrary, he is convinced that 
only by honestly confronting these emotions do we discover 
something about our own minds. Obscure writing reflects an 
author's fear of knowing something about himself and this in part 
explains both Kant's and Hegel's inability to express their philosophies 
clearly. In a style at once crisp and brusque, Kaufmann wastes no 
words to reveal his enormous dislike for Kant and to express his 
equally enormous admiration for Goethe, and in part for Hegel. 
But honesty is only a part of the explanation for Kaufmann's 
aggressive style. He tells us he loves philosophy and would like to see 
the mainstream take a new direction. Contemporary philosophers in 
phenomenology, existentialism, and analytic philosophy continue to 
imitate the philosophical style of Kant, which Kaufmann considers a 
"disaster." His contribution to this redirection of philosophy is to 
help destroy the myth that Kant was a rigorous, scientific thinker and 
to demonstrate that not only has Kant contributed little or nothing to 
the discovery of the mind but has actually impeded such a discovery 
by developing a misguided transcendental method in preference to 
history and psychology. 
Nonetheless, Kaufmann's feelings towards Kant are ambivalent. 
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On several occasions he refers to Kant as "one of the greatest 
philosophers of all time," in the same league with Plato and Aristotle. 
But he fails to tell us why or how Kant earns this high esteem. At one 
point Kaufmann mentions Kant's "comprehensive vision," which, 
however, he has already labeled a "disaster." He tells us that if he had 
to divide philosophers into the "good guys"and the "bad guys," Kant 
would certainly be placed among the "good guys." Why? It seems 
that despite the fact that Kant was unable to face it, he was a "daring" 
philosopher who helped to topple the rationahstc cosmology, 
theology, and psychology of his day. Kant's great failure lay in his 
inability to offer his convictions as hypotheses, mere suggestions, or 
educated guesses; rather, he made a pretense of scientific rigor, 
completeness, and finality, and succeeded in convincing most of his 
readers, as well as himself, that he had actually done so. 
Kaufmann accentuates Kant's failures as a thinker by contrasting 
him with Goethe, who, according to him, made the greatest 
contributions to the discovery of the mind. He quotes Nietzsche, who 
identified Kant as "the antipode of Goethe" in Twilight of the Idols 
(1889). Whereas Kant was a conceptual thinker, at home with 
abstractions and words, Goethe was a "visual" thinker, steeped in life 
experience, and who expressed his thoughts with a charming 
lucidity. 
The first and second sections of the book treat of Goethe's and 
Kant's contributions to the discovery of the mind, and their findings 
can be organized under four points. First, the question of human 
freedom and autonomy greatly interested both German thinkers, but 
their views are diametrically opposed. Wishing to stave off the 
determinism implied by a Newtonian world view, Kant held that we 
are free when our choices are determined, not by our inclinations or 
interests, but by our duty to obey moral laws because they are 
rational and hold for everyone. Kaufmann ironically interprets the 
Categorical Imperative to mean we are free only when we don't have 
"a will of our own." Goethe, on the other hand, takes "autonomy" to 
mean "independence," an Emersonian independence that translates 
into self-reliance and nonconformity; in contradistinction to Kant, it 
means having "a will of your own." Kaufmann regards Kantian 
ethics, as well as Kantian aesthetics, as reflections, not of the human 
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mind, but of Kant's peculiar mind with all its eccentricities. 
Secondly, according to Kaufmann, Kant was woefully out of 
touch with the realities of human life and experience; his personal life 
was extremely parochial and uncommon. A cerebral man of 
uncompromising routine, Kant was comfortable with conceptions 
and words, ever given to making unhelpful coinages; he totally 
lacked an aesthetic sense. And he made the fatal mistake of making 
his mind the model of the human mind, of uncritically universalizing 
the peculiarities of his upbringing and environment. By contrast, 
Goethe was a deeply experiential man with great artistic sensitivity. 
He identified man with his deeds and actions; thus, he rejected the 
belief that man has a static essence or an inner self or soul having a 
timeless structure. 
Thirdly, as Kaufmann interprets Kant, he believed that the 
human mind was a static entity, furnished with an unchanging set of 
categories and faculties, fixed for all time. But Goethe, as we have 
shown, was ever sensitive to the variant flux of becoming, to the 
dynamic, and understood the human mind as a process of development 
that could be grasped only in its movements. 
Finally, even more important is Goethe's refusal to support the 
method of Newtonian science as the paradigm of knowledge as Kant 
and others had done. Prejudiced against hypotheses and probability, 
the Newtonian model of science continued the classical bias in favor 
of the certainty and necessity of mathematics. Kant looked upon the 
concepts of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry as revelations 
of the immutable structure of the human mind itself. 
In staking out within the mind of man this immutable terrain, 
Kant secured for man a remnant of the transcendent and thus saved 
him from being engulfed by the phenomenal. In Whitehead's words, 
Kant provided man with "a refuge from the goading urgency of 
contingent happenings." Not unlike Plato, Kant sought to escape 
from contingency and change, developing a philosophy of universal 
and necessary laws in science and morals. Even in his personal life 
chance was allowed no entry; his daily activities were strictly 
regulated by a scrupulously administered schedule that extended to 
the quantity of tobacco he could smoke and the number of pills he 
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could take for his constipation. 
But Kant's static view of man became increasingly uncongenial 
to an age of revolution and a period committed to progress. George 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a product of the Enlighten-
ment and had been inspired, initially at least, by the "noble ideals" of 
the French Revolution. The last segment of the book deals with 
Hegel who, of course, inherited, as a legacy of the German Idealistic 
movement that was spawned by Kant's works, the idea of a 
philosophical science with the spurious rigor of mathematics. But 
Hegel had also been significantly influenced by Goethe, from whom 
he acquired the conviction that "the history of science is science 
itself." Hegel's Phenomenology of the Mind (1807) supports in-
consistent interpretations of the meaning of "phenomenology." On 
the one hand, it embodies the Goethean program of trying to catch 
the meaning of the mind in its development, in the process of its own 
becoming. On the other hand, the work is presented as a preparation 
for raising consciousness to the level of absolute knowledge; we are 
allegedly led, by a logical progression, from stage to stage wherein 
the transitions are "necessary." But all of this is pretense of scientific 
rigor, in imitation of the founder of the tradition, Kant. According to 
Kaufmann, the movements are arbitrary or rather dictated by 
aesthetic preference. However, despite his Kantian method Hegel 
does advance the discovery of the mind by the centrality of the 
Goethean themes in the Phenomenology, themes that continued to 
operate even in those students of his thought who turned against him, 
such as Marx, Kierkegaard, and Dewey. 
It seems to me that Discovering the Mind contributes to a 
redirection of philosophy already dramatically advanced by the 
American pragmatists of the last century, especially by Charles S. 
Peirce and William James. Peirce's emphasis on the "experimental 
method" and the tentative and fallible nature of both scientific and 
philosophical truth and James's redefinition of the mind as a "stream 
of consciousness" in his epoch making Principles of Psychology 
(1890) reflect the impact of Darwinism on post-Kantian philosophy, 
an impact from which Kantianism never recovered. The evolutionary 
hypothesis, as applied to science itself and to the nature of the mind, 
could not but make us view both as processes that can be understood 
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only in their respective movements or histories, a view expressed 
somewhat statically by Hegel. It was Goethe's genius to have already 
grasped this truth intuitively, even before Darwin gave it scientific 
respectability. 
But it was, as Whitehead called him, that "adorable" James who 
first formalized the realization that at bottom philosophic sides are 
taken by aesthetic preferences; whether one is at home with novelty 
and experimentation, as was Goethe, or whether one is more 
comfortable with the fixed and immutable, as was Kant, is ultimately 
decided by temperament, according to James. Psychology has much 
to do with our philosophies and cannot be excluded from them 
without doing violence to our experience and our own self-
understanding. 
After World War II, Walter Kaufmann's reinterpretation of 
Hegel, together with the neo-Marxist movement, did much to 
stimulate a renewed interest in Hegel studies. The redirection of 
philosophy which he hoped to influence with his critique of Kant and 
others in his projected trilogy involves two major reconstructions: 
one in philosophical method and the other in a reformulation of the 
nature of the human mind. 
Peter Farb and George Armelagos, Consuming Passions: The 
Anthropology of Eating. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980. 279 pp. 
$12.95. 
Review by Deborah K. DeCorso 
Eating, as everyone knows, is a biological necessity. It can also 
be a pleasant social event, a setting for the transaction of business, a 
religious ritual, a compulsion. Consuming Passions: The Anthropology 
of Eating is a survey of human eating habits, past and present, which 
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